When Personal Attacks Masquerade as Biblical Scholarship: A Response to Troy Salinger
Troy Salinger begins his article with an interesting admission. He announces that his response will be “highly polemical” and unusually personal because, apparently, my claims are so extraordinary that they demand such treatment. How convenient. Before offering a single grammatical argument, examining one Hebrew construction, or presenting any lexical evidence, Troy has already decided that personal attacks are an appropriate substitute for serious biblical engagement. Article linke here: https://letthetruthcomeoutblog.wordpress.com/2026/10/09/a-rebuttal-of-al-garzas-video-is-jesus-the-word-of-yhvh-looking-at-the-hebrew/?fbclid=IwY2xjawU3iqhleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBwZG9mBXNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR49i8xOc3ShYJsQC6yADiqt4YBtK0xHQ6dRSQYx_DHkBSS29Jwvb_UBoBgAmw_aem_hHGzoUPexIp1t6bZ_q1jQw
And this is supposed to be a scholarly rebuttal?
Troy immediately characterizes my presentation as “pretentious rhetoric,” accusing me of believing that my knowledge of Biblical Hebrew places my interpretations beyond meaningful challenge. Unfortunately for Troy, assigning motives to someone is not the same as demonstrating that their arguments are incorrect. In academic discourse, we generally expect a critic to establish what an author actually argues before attempting to refute it. Apparently, Troy prefers to skip that inconvenient step.
Let me make something perfectly clear: Knowing Biblical Hebrew does not automatically make someone’s interpretation correct. However, not knowing Biblical Hebrew certainly does not place someone in an advantageous position to correct arguments involving Hebrew morphology, syntax, and grammatical constructions. That should hardly be controversial.
My argument has never been that studying Hebrew makes someone infallible. Rather, my point is that when individuals make confident assertions about what a Hebrew passage supposedly means, they should possess sufficient linguistic competence to defend those assertions from the Hebrew text itself. This is not intellectual arrogance. It is a basic expectation of responsible biblical interpretation.
Troy then ventures into the remarkable accusation that I must believe my interpretations are “universally accepted by all trinitarians.” Where exactly did I make this claim? In what video did I argue that every Trinitarian Hebrew scholar agrees with me? Troy provides no quotation, timestamp, or supporting evidence. Instead, he constructs an imaginary position, attributes it to me, and prepares to refute it.
This is a textbook straw-man fallacy. My argument does not require universal agreement among Trinitarian scholars, nor does scholarly disagreement automatically invalidate a grammatical argument. Hebrew syntax is not determined by theological majority vote. Whether scholars agree or disagree with my conclusions, their interpretations must still be evaluated against the linguistic and contextual evidence.
The irony becomes especially apparent when Troy accuses me of letting theological presuppositions determine my reading of Scripture. That is a legitimate concern in biblical studies, but merely announcing that someone is reading their theology into the text does not establish that they are. Troy must show where I have incorrectly identified a Hebrew form, violated a syntactical principle, misapplied a lexical definition, or drawn an inference the passage cannot sustain.
Those are the questions that matter.
My video examines the Word of YHVH (דבר־יהוה) and whether certain Hebrew narratives present the Word as personally distinguishable from YHVH. This involves evaluating the Hebrew construct relationship, the verbal predicates associated with the Word, the narrative presentation of divine speech and appearance, and the broader literary context. The construct construction alone does not settle every theological question; one must consider the full grammatical and contextual evidence within the narrative.
These are legitimate questions of Hebrew grammar and exegesis. They cannot be dismissed simply by describing my conclusions as “idiosyncratic.”
If Troy believes my interpretation is grammatically incorrect, then he should identify the specific grammatical error and demonstrate why it is wrong. If he believes my syntactical analysis is defective, he should supply the correct analysis. If he believes the relevant Hebrew passages cannot support personal distinction, he should establish that conclusion through careful examination of the text.
That is how a scholarly rebuttal works.
Instead, his opening paragraphs tell readers considerably more about what Troy thinks of me than about what the Hebrew text actually says. His criticism is rich in psychological speculation, generous in personal accusations, and, at this stage, remarkably economical with linguistic evidence.
One would think that an article promising to expose my supposed grammatical incompetence might begin by demonstrating an actual grammatical mistake. But perhaps that would require engaging the Hebrew before engaging in character assassination.
Ultimately, I welcome substantive criticism of my interpretation. Biblical scholarship advances through careful analysis, competing arguments, and the examination of evidence. It does not advance, however, the assumption that calling someone pretentious somehow disproves their exegesis.
So, Troy, enough with the theatrical introduction. Show us the Hebrew. Identify the grammatical errors. Demonstrate the syntactical problems. Present the lexical evidence.
Until then, you have not refuted my argument. You have merely informed your readers that you dislike the person making it.
And frankly, that is not biblical scholarship. That is an opinion piece dressed in academic clothing.
Garza’s Purpose: Apparently, Asking a Question Is Now a Presupposition
Troy Salinger continues his criticism by quoting my stated purpose for the video: to examine the Hebrew expression “the Word of YHVH” and determine whether the biblical text presents the Word as a distinct person from YHVH and whether this figure could be identified with Jesus in the New Testament.
Thank you, Troy, for quoting my research question accurately. Unfortunately, what follows demonstrates a rather astonishing confusion between a research question, a theological hypothesis, and an exegetical conclusion. These concepts are not interchangeable, no matter how desperately Troy needs them to be.
Notice what I actually asked: Is the Word of YHVH a distinct person? Could this be Jesus in the Old Testament? These are questions requiring investigation of the biblical evidence. Yet Troy immediately announces that these questions reveal my underlying presupposition, which supposedly determines everything I teach.
Apparently, under Troy’s methodology, merely asking whether Scripture supports a particular interpretation proves that one has already predetermined the answer. What a remarkable approach to biblical scholarship! By that standard, no theologian, historian, or biblical scholar could investigate a hypothesis without automatically presupposing the conclusion.
But the problem becomes even more apparent when Troy writes:
“This is what drives all of his exegesis of scripture.”
Really, Troy? All of it? That is quite an extraordinary claim. Where is the evidence that every grammatical observation I make, every Hebrew construction I examine, and every syntactical relationship I identify is controlled by this theological conclusion? Once again, Troy provides an accusation without demonstrating it.
Let us examine what my argument actually involves.
The Hebrew expression דבר־יהוה (devar-YHVH) consists of the noun דבר (davar, “word”) in the construct state, followed by the divine name יהוה (YHVH). This is a construct relationship, commonly translated as “the Word of YHVH.”
The construct relationship itself does not automatically establish whether the Word is an impersonal communication or a personal figure. The surrounding narrative and context must answer that question, including the predicates associated with the Word, the speaker’s identity, and the relationship between the Word and YHVH within the discourse.
This distinction is fundamental to my argument, and it is precisely why I examine the Hebrew text rather than simply imposing a theological label on the expression.
Consider 1 Kings 19:9–11. In verse 9, the Hebrew narrative introduces the Word of YHVH coming to Elijah:
והנה דבר־יהוה אליו ויאמר לו
“And behold, the Word of YHVH came to him, and he said to him …”
The Word is introduced within a narrative of divine communication, followed by the masculine singular verbal form ויאמר (vayomer, “and he said”). The verbal form alone does not establish personal identity, since Hebrew can use such constructions in ordinary reports of divine speech. However, the narrative becomes particularly interesting in verse 11, where the speaker commands Elijah:
צא ועמדת בהר לפני יהוה
“Go out and stand on the mountain before YHVH.”
The passage then announces:
והנה יהוה עבר
“And behold, YHVH was passing by.”
Now we have an actual exegetical question. The Word of YHVH is introduced, the discourse proceeds through divine speech, and Elijah is instructed to stand before YHVH, who is subsequently described as passing by. Does this narrative distinguish the speaker from YHVH, or does it use a conventional form of third-person divine self-reference?
That is the question requiring analysis. A Trinitarian interpretation cannot simply assume the former, and a non-Trinitarian interpretation cannot simply assume the latter. Both must account for the grammatical and narrative evidence.
Likewise, 1 Samuel 3:21 states that YHVH revealed himself to Samuel at Shiloh בִּדְבַר יְהוָה (bidvar YHVH, “by the Word of YHVH”). Here the narrator explicitly associates YHVH’s appearance and self-revelation with the Word of YHVH. Context must establish whether this identifies the Word as a personal mediator or describes the means of prophetic revelation. Simply declaring that the Word can only mean an impersonal utterance does not settle the issue.
These passages present legitimate questions concerning Hebrew syntax, narrative discourse, and divine manifestation. They deserve serious examination.
And here is the point Troy conveniently overlooks: My argument is not that the Hebrew word דבר (davar) inherently means a divine person. My argument concerns whether particular biblical narratives present the Word of YHVH in a manner that supports personal distinction.
Those are two entirely different propositions.
Identifying the Word with Jesus involves a further question of canonical and theological interpretation. John 1:1 and 1:14 explicitly present the Word as personally related to God and subsequently becoming flesh. Whether particular Old Testament appearances should be connected with the Johannine Logos must be argued through the relevant texts. It cannot be established merely by pointing to the Hebrew noun דבר, nor dismissed by pretending that later biblical revelation is irrelevant to Christian theological interpretation.
Troy then concludes his section with perhaps his most revealing statement:
“It is my suspicion that the reason he pursued studies in the original language was to discover, in the grammar, ways to support and defend this presupposition.”
There it is. When the grammatical argument has not yet been addressed, apparently the next best strategy is to speculate about the personal motivations of the individual presenting it.
How very scholarly.
Troy admits that this is merely his “suspicion.” In other words, he has no demonstrated evidence for why I pursued biblical language studies, yet he considers his speculation important enough to include in an article supposedly devoted to refuting Hebrew exegesis.
This is a form of the genetic fallacy: attempting to undermine an argument by appealing to its alleged psychological or theological origins rather than evaluating whether its premises and conclusions are sound.
Even if someone began studying Hebrew specifically to investigate a theological belief, that fact would not determine whether their subsequent grammatical observations were correct. A person’s motivation cannot change the morphology of a Hebrew noun, the function of a construct relationship, or the syntactical features of a biblical narrative.
And let us apply Troy’s reasoning consistently. Does his own non-Trinitarian theological framework influence the questions he asks and the interpretations he favors? If so, does that automatically invalidate his conclusions? Of course not. He must evaluate his arguments on their merits, just as I must evaluate mine.
The issue is not whether an interpreter possesses theological commitments. The issue is whether those commitments are allowed to override the evidence of the text.
Troy has every opportunity to demonstrate that I have committed precisely such an error. He can identify a misparsed Hebrew verb, an incorrectly explained construct relationship, a mistaken antecedent, or an unjustified conclusion about a narrative participant’s identity.
Instead, he offers readers his personal theory about why I decided to study Hebrew.
Troy, I am not asking you to psychoanalyze my academic interests. I am asking you to engage the Hebrew text.
If my grammatical analysis is incorrect, show me where. If the Hebrew syntax contradicts my conclusions, explain how. If the narrative evidence does not support personal distinction, establish that exegetically.
But suggesting that my theological commitments somehow disqualify my interpretation, while leaving your own theological commitments conveniently outside the discussion, is neither consistent nor persuasive.
So far, Troy has attempted to establish my presuppositions without establishing my grammatical errors. Perhaps in the next section we will finally examine the Hebrew instead of another examination of my supposed motives.
Garza’s Method: When Basic Hebrew Grammar Becomes a Theological Threat
Troy Salinger now turns his attention to what he calls “Garza’s Method,” and once again, his criticism reveals more about his determination to discredit me than about any actual grammatical error in my presentation.
He begins by acknowledging that I distinguished between two Hebrew constructions: דְּבַר־יְהוָה (devar YHVH) and דִּבֶּר יְהוָה (dibber YHVH). The former is a nominal construct relationship, while the latter is a verbal clause.
So far, so good. Troy has correctly described the grammatical distinction I presented. One might reasonably expect him to demonstrate why my grammatical explanation is incorrect.
But apparently, that would be too straightforward.
Instead, Troy launches into several paragraphs speculating about what I supposedly believe concerning non-Trinitarians, Trinitarian scholars, and anyone who disagrees with my interpretation.
Remarkably, he discusses my supposed method without identifying a single error in the Hebrew morphology I presented.
Let us begin with the grammar Troy apparently finds so objectionable.
1. The Hebrew Distinction Is Grammatical, Not Imaginary
The expression דְּבַר־יְהוָה (devar YHVH) consists of two nominal elements:
- דְּבַר (devar): a masculine singular noun in the construct state, meaning “word of.”
- יְהוָה (YHVH): the divine proper name, functioning as the second member of the construct relationship.
Together, the expression means “the Word of YHVH.”
By contrast, דִּבֶּר יְהוָה (dibber YHVH) consists of a verb followed by its subject:
- דִּבֶּר (dibber): Piel perfect, third-person masculine singular, meaning “he spoke.”
- יְהוָה (YHVH): the grammatical subject performing the action.
Thus, the verbal construction means “YHVH spoke.”
Both forms derive from the Hebrew root דבר (D-B-R), but they are not grammatically interchangeable. One is a noun in a construct relationship; the other is a finite verb followed by its subject.
This is not some obscure Trinitarian grammatical innovation that I recently discovered buried beneath centuries of biblical scholarship. It is elementary Biblical Hebrew morphology.
For example, Deuteronomy 5:4 reads:
פנים בפנים דבר יהוה עמכם
“Face to face YHVH spoke with you.”
Here, דִּבֶּר (dibber) is a Piel perfect verb, and YHVH is its subject. The passage explicitly describes YHVH performing the action of speaking.
Now compare 1 Kings 19:9:
והנה דבר־יהוה אליו ויאמר לו
“And behold, the Word of YHVH [came] to him, and he said to him …”
Here, דְּבַר־יְהוָה (devar YHVH) is a nominal expression introduced within the narrative. It is not the finite verb דִּבֶּר (dibber). The subsequent verb וַיֹּאמֶר (vayomer, “and he said”) introduces speech, raising questions about how the narrator presents the speaker.
These are different grammatical constructions serving different syntactical functions.
Does the construct relationship alone prove that the Word is a distinct divine person? No. Nor have I established personal distinction merely by identifying the construct state. Personal identity must be determined by examining the complete narrative, the associated verbal predicates, and the relationship between the participants in the discourse.
That is precisely why the grammatical distinction matters.
And what, exactly, has Troy demonstrated to be incorrect about this distinction?
Absolutely nothing.
For those interested in an actual Hebrew grammar rather than Troy’s speculation about my motives, see Gesenius–Kautzsch–Cowley, Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar, §89, on the construct state, and §52, on the Piel verbal stem.
2. Troy Confuses Grammatical Competence With Interpretive Infallibility
Troy then makes the following extraordinary statement:
“The logical conclusion to this reasoning is that anyone with a thorough knowledge of Hebrew grammar should and would, in fact, come to the same interpretational conclusion that Garza does.”
No, Troy. That is not the logical conclusion. That is the conclusion you have manufactured so that you can spend several paragraphs arguing against something I did not say.
There is an important distinction between understanding what a Hebrew construction grammatically represents and determining what a passage ultimately teaches theologically.
Two scholars may agree completely that דְּבַר־יְהוָה is a construct relationship and still disagree about whether a particular narrative presents the Word as an impersonal divine communication, a literary personification, or a personal manifestation.
Such disagreement is entirely possible. Indeed, such disagreements are commonplace in biblical scholarship.
But here is what Troy seems unwilling to acknowledge: Before someone can responsibly dispute a conclusion based on Hebrew syntax, that individual must first understand the Hebrew syntax being discussed.
Surely this distinction is not too difficult to grasp.
Recognizing the difference between a Hebrew noun and a Hebrew verb does not make someone a Trinitarian. It makes that person competent to recognize a basic grammatical distinction.
Understanding the construct state does not automatically establish the doctrine of the Trinity. It simply prevents someone from misidentifying the grammatical relationship between the words.
And studying Biblical Hebrew does not eliminate interpretive disagreement. It provides the linguistic tools necessary to evaluate competing interpretations.
Troy apparently considers this expectation problematic. I consider it the bare minimum for anyone making confident public claims about the meaning of the Hebrew Scriptures.
3. What About Trinitarian Hebrew Scholars Who Disagree With Me?
Troy next asks what I would say about Trinitarian Hebrew scholars who disagree with my conclusions.
The answer is remarkably simple: I would examine their arguments.
What an astonishing concept!
A scholar’s theological affiliation does not determine whether their exegesis is correct. I do not accept an interpretation merely because its author is Trinitarian, nor do I reject one merely because its author is non-Trinitarian.
The determining issue is the textual evidence.
If a qualified Hebrew scholar disagrees with my interpretation of the Word of YHVH, I expect that scholar to demonstrate why the narrative does not support the personal distinction I have proposed. What about the scholars who do agree? See ISRAEL’S LORD: YHWH AS “TWO POWERS” IN SECOND TEMPLE LITERATURE, pg. 39-41.
Does the passage employ ordinary prophetic communication? Does the relevant verb have an impersonal subject? Is there evidence of personification? Is a third-person reference an instance of divine self-reference rather than a distinction between speakers?
These are legitimate exegetical questions.
What is not legitimate is pretending that disagreement itself somehow constitutes a grammatical refutation.
Furthermore, Troy claims that there are “legion” numbers of orthodox Hebrew scholars who disagree with my interpretation.
Excellent! Then name them. Identify their publications. Cite their grammatical analyses. Explain precisely how their interpretations account for the Hebrew constructions under discussion.
A supposed army of unnamed scholars is not an academic citation, Troy.
Merely claiming that numerous scholars disagree with me proves nothing about whether their interpretations adequately explain the text.
And even if every scholar Troy could assemble agreed against my interpretation, their agreement would not, by itself, settle the grammatical and exegetical questions. Scholarly consensus deserves serious consideration, but it does not eliminate the obligation to examine the arguments supporting it.
4. The Actual Exegetical Question Troy Continues to Avoid
My argument concerning the Word of YHVH is not built upon the childish proposition that every occurrence of the noun דבר (davar) must refer to a distinct divine person.
Rather, I examine passages in which the Word of YHVH appears in narratives involving divine communication, revelation, and potentially distinguishable participants.
Consider 1 Samuel 3:21:
ויסף יהוה להראה בשלה כי נגלה יהוה אל שמואל בשלו בדבר יהוה
“And YHVH continued to appear at Shiloh, for YHVH revealed himself to Samuel at Shiloh by the Word of YHVH.”
Notice the relationship between divine appearance, divine revelation, and the Word of YHVH.
The text employs language of appearance and revelation, concluding with the expression בִּדְבַר יְהוָה (bidvar YHVH), “by the Word of YHVH.”
Now, is this simply a reference to YHVH revealing himself through prophetic communication, or does the larger narrative allow us to understand the Word as a personal means of divine revelation?
That is an exegetical question worth investigating.
The instrumental preposition בְּ (be, “by” or “through”) does not, on its own, establish the Word’s personhood. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Word and divine self-revelation deserves examination within the narrative context.
Similarly, in 1 Kings 19:9–11, the Word of YHVH is introduced in the account of Elijah’s encounter, after which the narrative includes the command to stand before YHVH, who is described as passing by.
The interpreter must investigate the speaker’s identity and determine whether the discourse reflects divine self-reference or a meaningful distinction within the narrative.
These questions cannot be answered merely by announcing that the Word of YHVH must be impersonal because one’s theology requires it.
Nor can they be answered by assuming that a nominal construct automatically establishes a second divine person.
The evidence must be examined, and that is precisely what I am attempting to do.
Troy, however, seems considerably more interested in discussing what he imagines goes on inside my head than what actually appears in the Hebrew text.
5. When Insulting the Audience Becomes Part of the Argument
Finally, Troy concludes this section by accusing me of marginalizing non-Trinitarians in the minds of my “gullible followers.”
That statement is rather revealing.
Apparently, people who watch my videos, examine the Hebrew text, and find my arguments persuasive must be gullible. Evidently, the possibility that intelligent readers might independently evaluate the evidence and reach conclusions different from Troy’s is too difficult for him to entertain.
And yet Troy accuses me of intellectual arrogance.
The irony is difficult to miss.
I have never maintained that every non-Trinitarian lacks Hebrew knowledge. My criticism concerns individuals who make categorical assertions about Hebrew grammar without demonstrating the linguistic competence necessary to sustain those assertions. Broad claims about any theological group should, of course, be supported by specific examples rather than assumed to apply to every member.
But the issue remains straightforward: when someone claims that a Hebrew construction means something, that claim should be evaluated through Hebrew grammar, not protected from scrutiny by accusations of arrogance or theological bias.
If Troy believes I have misrepresented a particular non-Trinitarian interpreter’s grammatical understanding, he is free to document it.
If he believes the construct relationship is analyzed incorrectly, he should demonstrate the error.
If he believes the narrative evidence does not support personal distinction, he should explain why.
These would all be reasonable avenues of criticism.
Calling my audience gullible is not one of them.
Conclusion: Where Is the Grammatical Refutation?
After all of Troy’s complaints about my method, one simple fact remains.
He has not demonstrated that דְּבַר־יְהוָה is anything other than a nominal construct relationship. He has not demonstrated that דִּבֶּר יְהוָה is anything other than a verbal construction. He has not shown that my distinction between these grammatical forms is incorrect.
Instead, he has repeatedly transformed a basic linguistic observation into an imaginary claim of interpretive infallibility.
The distinction between the two Hebrew constructions is a grammatical fact. Whether particular appearances of the Word of YHVH support personal distinction is an exegetical question. Confusing those two issues does not refute either one.
Troy appears convinced that exposing my supposed arrogance will somehow disprove my Hebrew analysis. Unfortunately, grammatical constructions are stubborn things. They do not change their morphological classifications merely because someone dislikes the theological conclusions another interpreter draws from them.
So, Troy, you have now devoted another section to explaining what you believe I must believe, what you suspect I must think about other scholars, and why you consider my audience gullible.
Very impressive.
But perhaps we could finally move beyond the amateur psychology and deal with the Biblical Hebrew.
After all, your article’s title promises a refutation of my interpretation.
At some point, one would expect you to actually provide one.
Garza’s Claim: Troy Finally Discovers the Hebrew Construct State-But Misses the Exegetical Question
After spending considerable time discussing my supposed arrogance, theological presuppositions, and my audience’s intellectual shortcomings, Troy Salinger finally attempts to engage the Hebrew grammar itself.
Progress at last!
Unfortunately, Troy confuses a grammatical distinction with an entire exegetical argument, as though showing that the Hebrew construct state does not independently establish personhood somehow proves that the Word of YHVH cannot be personally distinguished from YHVH in a particular narrative.
Those are two very different propositions.
Troy describes my distinction between דְּבַר־יְהוָה (devar YHVH) and דִּבֶּר יְהוָה (dibber YHVH) and then announces that my position is among the most “inane” and “bizarre” things he has ever heard.
That is quite an emotional reaction to two elementary Hebrew grammatical constructions.
Let us examine the actual evidence rather than Troy’s colorful commentary.
1. The Construct State and the Maqqef: What the Hebrew Grammar Actually Establishes
The expression דְּבַר־יְהוָה (devar YHVH) consists of a masculine singular noun in the construct state followed by the divine proper name YHVH.
The expression דִּבֶּר יְהוָה (dibber YHVH), however, consists of a Piel perfect verb, third-person masculine singular, followed by its grammatical subject, YHVH.
These constructions are grammatically different.
In the first, דבר (davar) is a noun functioning within a construct relationship. In the second, דִּבֶּר (dibber) is a finite verb describing the action of speaking.
Troy acknowledges this distinction. Nevertheless, he argues that the noun דבר can still refer to a message spoken by YHVH.
On that point, Troy is correct.
Yes, Troy. Correct.
Unlike your characterization of my methodology, I have no difficulty acknowledging a valid grammatical observation, even when it comes from someone who disagrees with my theological conclusions.
The Hebrew noun דָּבָר (davar) certainly can refer to speech, a message, a command, or a divine communication. Standard Hebrew lexicons, including Brown–Driver–Briggs under the entry דָּבָר, document this.
The morphological distinction between a noun and a verb does not mean that the noun cannot refer to the content of something spoken.
But notice what follows.
The fact that דבר can denote a spoken message does not establish that every narrative occurrence of דְּבַר־יְהוָה must refer exclusively to an impersonal message. That would require an additional contextual argument.
This is precisely where lexical meaning and referential identity must be distinguished.
A word’s semantic range identifies what the word can mean. Context determines how that word functions in a particular passage.
Surely Troy understands that distinction, or at least he should before declaring someone else’s interpretation grammatically absurd.
2. What Does the Maqqef Actually Do?
Troy next criticizes my comments concerning the Hebrew maqqef (־), which connects the elements in the expression דְּבַר־יְהוָה.
Here we need to be particularly precise.
According to Gesenius–Kautzsch–Cowley, Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar, §16a, the maqqef links words into a single accentual unit. The connected words are treated as one unit for purposes of stress and accentuation.
That is an established feature of the Masoretic reading tradition.
But an accentual unit is not necessarily a single lexical word, and phonological unity does not establish personal identity.
When I described devar-YHVH as being pronounced together, I was addressing this accentual relationship. The expression “Word-YHVH” can serve as shorthand for the closely connected Hebrew designation, but it should not be mistaken for a literal grammatical translation that eliminates the construct relationship.
The proper grammatical rendering remains “the Word of YHVH.”
If my spoken wording suggested that the maqqef itself transforms two words into a single divine name, that would be imprecise, and I have no reason to defend that inference.
Furthermore, the written maqqef belongs to the Masoretic accentuation system. It should not be treated as though the original author of Genesis inserted the symbol to establish a theological identity. The Masoretic tradition preserves important reading information, but its accentuation is not independent proof of an original christological intention.
Now, does any of this refute the possibility that the Word of YHVH functions personally within a biblical narrative?
Not remotely.
Troy correctly observes that the construct state expresses a genitive relationship. Gesenius discusses precisely this relationship in §§89 and 128.
But a genitive relationship does not, by itself, determine whether its head noun refers to a person, an object, an abstract quality, or an act of communication.
Consider the expression מַלְאַךְ יְהוָה (malakh YHVH), “the messenger of YHVH.”
This is a construct relationship, yet the referent is a personal messenger.
Now consider יַד־יְהוָה (yad YHVH), “the hand of YHVH,” in Exodus 9:3.
This also employs a construct relationship, but the expression describes divine activity through figurative language rather than identifying a separate person.
The construct relationship is present in both cases. The referents are interpreted differently because the lexical meanings and narrative contexts differ.
Imagine that!
The grammatical construction identifies a relationship between the elements. It does not independently determine the ontological identity of the referent.
Consequently, my argument concerning the Word of YHVH must be evaluated through the passages themselves.
Troy has correctly explained why the maqqef alone cannot prove personhood. He has not shown why the broader narrative cannot support a personal interpretation.
Those are not the same accomplishment.
3. Genesis 15:1: The Passage Troy Needs to Explain
Troy then turns to Genesis 15:1, the first occurrence of the expression devar YHVH in the Hebrew Bible.
The Hebrew reads:
אחר הדברים האלה היה דבר־יהוה אל־אברם במחזה לאמר
“After these things, the Word of YHVH came to Abram in a vision, saying …”
Notice several important features of the passage.
First, the subject of the clause is דבר־יהוה (devar YHVH), not YHVH followed by a finite verb meaning “he spoke.”
Second, the clause employs הָיָה (hayah), a Qal perfect third-person masculine singular form, in the conventional construction describing the coming of the Word.
Third, the revelation occurs בַּמַּחֲזֶה (bammahazeh), “in a vision.”
Fourth, the Word introduces a first-person divine declaration:
אנכי מגן לך
“I am a shield to you.”
These observations do not automatically establish that the Word is a distinct divine person. The construction describing the coming of the Word is also familiar from prophetic reports of divine communication.
However, this narrative involves a vision and a divine speaker. Its meaning cannot be exhausted merely by defining דבר as “message.”
The interpreter must ask how the speaker is presented throughout the entire encounter.
Troy seems content to establish that the noun can refer to communication and then treat the personal interpretation as though it has been linguistically eliminated.
But demonstrating a possible lexical meaning is not the same as demonstrating an exclusive contextual meaning.
This distinction is basic to responsible exegesis.
4. Genesis 15:2: Whom Does Abram Address?
Troy then objects to my observation concerning Abram’s response in verse 2.
The Hebrew reads:
ויאמר אברם אדני יהוה מה תתן־לי
“And Abram said, ‘Adonai YHVH, what will you give me?’”
Let us follow the literary sequence.
In verse 1, the narrator introduces the Word of YHVH coming to Abram in a vision and delivering a first-person divine declaration.
In verse 2, Abram responds by addressing Adonai YHVH directly.
That is what the text says.
Now, does this response by itself prove that the Word is a person distinct from YHVH? No. Abram could be addressing YHVH as the source of the revelation communicated through his Word.
But the narrative does establish that the divine communication is part of an encounter in which Abram addresses YHVH personally.
The relevant question is how the narrator develops the speaker’s identity.
And this is where Troy’s treatment becomes remarkably selective.
5. Genesis 15:4–7: The Narrative Continues
In Genesis 15:4, the narrator again explicitly introduces the Word of YHVH:
והנה דבר־יהוה אליו לאמר
“And behold, the Word of YHVH [came] to him, saying …”
The passage then proceeds to verse 5:
ויוצא אתו החוצה ויאמר
“And he brought him outside and said …”
Notice that the narrator introduces the Word of YHVH in verse 4 and immediately continues in verse 5 with third-person masculine singular verbs describing the action of bringing Abram outside and speaking to him.
The grammatical subject of these verbs is not explicitly repeated in verse 5.
This raises an important question regarding participant continuity: who is the understood subject of these actions?
The immediate discourse has introduced the Word of YHVH, while the larger narrative identifies YHVH as the divine speaker. The interpreter must determine whether the narration simply continues YHVH’s communication or presents the Word as the operative manifestation within the vision.
The verb וַיּוֹצֵא (vayyotse, “and he brought out”) is especially interesting because it describes more than the content of a verbal announcement. It presents an action within the visionary encounter.
Admittedly, the action can be understood as part of the visionary experience without requiring an independently embodied figure. Nevertheless, we must evaluate that possibility from the narrative, not settle it by pointing to the dictionary definition of דבר.
Then comes Genesis 15:7:
ויאמר אליו אני יהוה אשר הוצאתיך מאור כשדים
“And he said to him, ‘I am YHVH, who brought you out of Ur of the Chaldeans.’”
Now we have a clear first-person identification of the speaker as YHVH.
The interpretive question is therefore not merely whether YHVH communicated a message. Everyone agrees that divine communication occurs.
The question is how the Word’s introduction, the sustained dialogue, the visionary setting, the action in verse 5, and the speaker’s self-identification in verse 7 relate to one another.
Does the narrator present the Word as the divine communication itself? As a manifestation of YHVH? Or as a personal figure distinguishable from YHVH while bearing the divine identity?
These possibilities require contextual analysis and comparison with other biblical passages.
What cannot be responsibly done is to declare that the noun דבר necessarily excludes a personal referent simply because it frequently denotes a spoken message.
That would substitute a lexical generalization for an exegetical argument.
6. First Occurrence Does Not Mean Automatic Interpretation
Troy also objects to my emphasis on Genesis 15:1 as the first occurrence of devar YHVH.
He claims that I simply establish my preferred interpretation there and then impose it upon every subsequent passage.
Once again, he confuses literary comparison with grammatical necessity.
The earliest occurrence of an expression is relevant because it provides an initial narrative context in which that expression appears. It may help identify themes and patterns developed in subsequent passages.
However, first occurrence does not create an inflexible grammatical rule governing every later use of the expression.
The same Hebrew expression can function differently in different literary contexts.
For example, the Word of YHVH may be presented as the content of prophetic revelation in one passage, while another passage may use more elaborate language of appearance, action, or personification.
A responsible investigation must examine these occurrences individually and then determine whether a consistent theological pattern emerges.
That is not an attempt to manufacture a doctrine from a single verse. It is an effort to understand the expression within its broader biblical usage.
Troy is perfectly entitled to disagree with my interpretation of Genesis 15.
But he must establish his alternative reading through the text rather than merely announce that my interpretation is impossible.
7. Genesis 24:51 and Exodus 4:30: The Grammatical Contrast Remains
Troy then dismisses my comparison with Genesis 24:51 and Exodus 4:30 as “totally irrelevant.”
Really?
Genesis 24:51 contains:
כאשר דבר יהוה
“As YHVH has spoken.”
Here, דִּבֶּר (dibber) is a Piel perfect verb describing an action performed by YHVH.
Exodus 4:30 reads:
וידבר אהרן את כל־הדברים אשר־דבר יהוה אל־משה
“And Aaron spoke all the words that YHVH had spoken to Moses.”
This verse is particularly instructive because it contains both the noun דְּבָרִים (devarim, “words”) and the verb דִּבֶּר (dibber, “he spoke”).
The noun refers to the words, while the verb describes the action of speaking.
In other words, the biblical text itself demonstrates the grammatical distinction.
It also demonstrates that the noun can designate the content of what was spoken.
There is no contradiction here.
The distinction is relevant to accurate morphological analysis, even though it does not independently determine the personal or impersonal referent of the expression devar YHVH in every passage.
Troy mistakes the limitations of a grammatical observation for the elimination of every broader exegetical argument in which that observation appears.
They do not.
8. Troy’s Appeal to Scholarly Ridicule Is Not an Argument
Troy makes the rather theatrical assertion that no Hebrew scholar would dare agree with my interpretation for fear of being laughed out of academia.
That is quite a claim.
One might reasonably expect a scholarly citation to follow such an absolute declaration.
Instead, we receive an imagined scene in which unnamed Hebrew scholars collectively ridicule an interpretation Troy considers unacceptable.
Unfortunately, hypothetical academic laughter is not a recognized method of Hebrew exegesis.
If Troy wishes to cite Hebrew grammarians demonstrating that the maqqef does not prove personal distinction, I agree. Gesenius already establishes the proper grammatical function of the maqqef.
If he wishes to cite lexicographers demonstrating that דבר frequently denotes divine communication, I agree with that as well. Brown–Driver–Briggs documents this usage precisely.
But neither source proves that every narrative occurrence of the Word of YHVH must be ontologically impersonal.
That conclusion requires a different argument.
Likewise, neither source establishes that Genesis 15 presents the Word as a distinct divine person. That conclusion must be argued from the narrative evidence and, for a specifically Christian identification with Jesus, from the broader canonical context.
The theological thesis must stand or fall upon that evidence.
Conclusion: Troy Has Corrected a Grammatical Overstatement, Not Refuted the Exegetical Thesis
Let us summarize what Troy has actually established.
He is correct that the Hebrew construct state does not inherently identify a distinct person. He is correct that the maqqef does not transform two lexical words into a single divine name. He is also correct that דבר can refer to a message spoken by YHVH.
I have no difficulty acknowledging those grammatical facts.
What Troy has not demonstrated is that Genesis 15 excludes a personal manifestation of the Word, that the narrative’s presentation of the speaker cannot support such an interpretation, or that the larger biblical evidence rules out a personal distinction.
Those are separate propositions, and they require separate arguments.
Correcting an imprecise grammatical explanation does not disprove the theological thesis the explanation was intended to investigate.
Troy appears to believe that because the maqqef does not establish personhood, the entire question of the Word’s personal identity has somehow disappeared.
It has not.
The proper exegetical investigation begins with Hebrew morphology, proceeds through syntax and discourse analysis, and then evaluates the relevant biblical narratives in their literary and theological contexts.
In Genesis 15, that means explaining the Word’s arrival in a vision, Abram’s direct response to YHVH, the renewed introduction of the Word in verse 4, the unnamed subject of the actions in verse 5, and the speaker’s explicit identification as YHVH in verse 7.
An impersonal-message interpretation must account for these details. A personal-manifestation interpretation must do the same.
Neither interpretation becomes correct simply because its advocate declares the alternative ridiculous.
So, Troy, congratulations on explaining that the maqqef does not establish a divine person. On that point, we can agree.
But you have not demonstrated that the Word of YHVH cannot be personally distinguished within the biblical narrative.
You have demonstrated what the grammatical construction does not prove.
Now perhaps you can address what the narrative actually presents.
Because, despite the insults and theatrical declarations of scholarly outrage, that remains the question your article is supposed to answer.
And no amount of sarcasm, mine or yours, can substitute for the Hebrew evidence.
Troy Salinger’s Rebuttal: When English Translations Replace Hebrew Exegesis
Troy Salinger finally arrives at what he considers his devastating rebuttal of my interpretation of the Word of YHVH. After repeatedly accusing me of misunderstanding Biblical Hebrew, he begins his supposed grammatical refutation by presenting a collection of English Bible translations.
Yes, English translations.
Apparently, after emphasizing how allegedly defective my Hebrew analysis is, Troy believes that assembling several English renderings of Genesis 15:1 settles the matter.
One would think that a critique of Hebrew syntax would begin with Hebrew syntax. But perhaps that expectation is unreasonable.
More importantly, Troy’s lengthy response repeatedly confuses three separate questions: what the Hebrew expression דְּבַר־יְהוָה (devar YHVH) means grammatically, how that expression functions in a particular narrative, and whether the larger biblical evidence permits identifying the Word as a personal manifestation of YHVH.
These questions are related, but they are not identical.
And Troy’s repeated failure to distinguish them is precisely why much of his supposed rebuttal misses the actual exegetical issue.
1. The NET Bible: Since When Does an English Translation Settle Ontology?
Troy begins with the NET Bible, which translates Genesis 15:1 using the expression “the LORD’s message.”
He then lists several additional English versions that employ similar renderings.
Apparently, the fact that these translations understand the Word of YHVH as divine communication is supposed to demonstrate that my interpretation is grammatically impossible.
But that conclusion does not follow.
The Hebrew noun דָּבָר (davar) has a recognized semantic range that includes a word, matter, thing, command, and message. Nobody familiar with Biblical Hebrew should dispute that.
Consequently, translating דְּבַר־יְהוָה as “the message of YHVH” is perfectly legitimate in contexts where the expression denotes divine communication.
But Troy apparently believes that establishing one legitimate semantic meaning automatically eliminates every other possible contextual function.
That is not how lexical semantics works.
Consider a basic distinction: the meaning of a noun does not, by itself, determine the ontological status of its referent.
A translation communicates what the translators understand a passage to mean. It does not necessarily resolve every exegetical or theological question the original text raises.
The NET translators may reasonably conclude that Genesis 15:1 describes a divine message. Their interpretation deserves consideration. But their English rendering does not grammatically demonstrate that the Word cannot be understood personally within a broader theological interpretation. Also, in 1Kings 19 the NET bible identifies “the LORD’s message” as the LORD himself: “The LORD said, ‘Go out and stand on the mountain before the LORD. Look, the LORD is ready to pass by.” (1Kings 19:11). Does the NET Bible identify two LORDs?
Likewise, the NIV’s decision to retain “the word of the LORD” does not prove my interpretation either.
Both are translation choices.
In fact, some of Troy’s examples are explicitly interpretive paraphrases. The NIRV and CEV recast the Hebrew nominal expression into ordinary English verbal descriptions of YHVH speaking.
That may accurately communicate the translators’ understanding of the event, but it does not reproduce the precise Hebrew grammatical construction.
The Hebrew remains:
היה דבר־יהוה אל־אברם במחזה
The subject is דְּבַר־יְהוָה, the Word of YHVH.
It is not the finite verbal construction דִּבֶּר יְהוָה, “YHVH spoke.”
The two constructions can describe related realities without becoming grammatically identical.
Translation equivalence does not eliminate morphological distinction.
Troy appears to think that because the two constructions can communicate a similar idea in English, their Hebrew differences are therefore irrelevant.
That conclusion is linguistically careless.
Furthermore, Troy emphasizes that the NET translators are Trinitarians, apparently believing that their theological affiliation makes their translation an especially powerful objection to my position.
What happened to Troy’s earlier complaint that I supposedly appeal to Trinitarian agreement?
Does a translator’s theological affiliation suddenly become decisive when Troy finds the translation convenient?
The NET deserves evaluation because of its scholarship, not because its translators affirm or deny a particular theological doctrine.
And if an English rendering is all that is required to determine an Old Testament figure’s personal identity, we might as well abandon the discussion of Hebrew grammar entirely.
Unfortunately for Troy, Hebrew exegesis requires considerably more than collecting translations that support one’s preferred reading.
2. Genesis 15:1 and Troy’s Telegraph Illustration
Troy next attempts to demonstrate that the Word of YHVH coming to Abram does not imply a personal being.
His illustration involves a message arriving by telegraph.
A telegraph.
We are examining an ancient Hebrew narrative involving divine revelation, and Troy’s analogy is a nineteenth-century communication technology.
Of course, a message can be said to come to someone. That is not disputed.
Indeed, Genesis 15:1 uses the verb הָיָה (hayah, “was” or “came to be”) in a construction conventionally translated as the Word coming to Abram.
The verse does not employ the ordinary motion verb בּוֹא (bo, “to come”) to describe a physical arrival.
This is precisely why my interpretation must be argued from the larger narrative, not simply from the English word “came.”
But Troy’s illustration proves considerably less than he imagines.
Showing that a message can arrive does not establish that the Word of YHVH is necessarily impersonal in every passage.
It merely establishes that an impersonal reading is possible.
And possibility is not exclusivity.
The fundamental question remains whether the biblical narrative develops the Word as divine communication alone or also permits the language of personal manifestation.
Troy has not resolved that question by invoking Western Union.
3. Genesis 15:1–7: Troy Supplies Details the Text Never Mentions
Troy then confidently reconstructs the encounter between Abram and YHVH.
According to Troy, Abram was inside his tent, where YHVH appeared in the representative image of a man. Everything occurred mentally, and YHVH subsequently took Abram outside the tent within the vision.
Interesting.
There is just one problem.
Genesis 15 never tells us that YHVH appeared inside Abram’s tent in the form of a man.
Those details are Troy’s reconstruction, not statements made by the narrator. That is called eisegesis.
Let us examine the actual Hebrew.
Genesis 15:1 states:
היה דבר־יהוה אל־אברם במחזה לאמר
“The Word of YHVH came to Abram in a vision, saying …”
The noun מַחֲזֶה (machazeh) denotes a vision.
I agree that the encounter is presented as visionary revelation.
But Troy makes an unjustified leap when he argues that because something occurs in a vision, it can only be a mental event involving representative images rather than an encounter with an actual personal being.
That is a false dichotomy.
The medium through which someone perceives a revelation does not independently determine the ontological status of the one revealed.
A visionary encounter can communicate real information about an actual person without requiring that person to be physically present in an ordinary material form.
Consider the visions of Daniel 7.
Daniel sees the Ancient of Days and one like a son of man.
Does the visionary nature of the account mean that the Ancient of Days is merely an imaginary character produced within Daniel’s mind?
Obviously not.
The figures are presented within a symbolic visionary setting, but the question of their referents is not settled by the fact that Daniel experiences a vision.
Similarly, Revelation 4–5 presents heavenly figures within John’s vision. Their visionary presentation does not automatically make them ontologically unreal.
A vision describes a mode of revelation, not necessarily the nonexistence or impersonality of the one revealed.
Troy therefore cannot simply announce that Genesis 15 takes place in Abram’s mind and conclude that no personal manifestation is possible.
Even if the entire encounter occurred within a visionary experience, that would not determine whether the Word is personal or impersonal.
Furthermore, Genesis 15:4 again introduces the Word of YHVH:
והנה דבר־יהוה אליו לאמר
“And behold, the Word of YHVH [came] to him, saying …”
Then verse 5 continues:
ויוצא אתו החוצה ויאמר
“And he brought him outside and said …”
The verb וַיּוֹצֵא (vayyotse) is Hiphil wayyiqtol, third-person masculine singular, from the root יצא, meaning that the subject caused Abram to go out or brought him outside.
The following וַיֹּאמֶר (vayyomer) is another third-person masculine singular verbal form.
The subject is not explicitly named again in verse 5.
The immediate discourse has introduced the Word of YHVH in verse 4, while the broader encounter identifies YHVH as the divine speaker.
Determining the referent of the third-person verbs is therefore a question of discourse analysis and narrative continuity.
Troy’s interpretation understands YHVH as acting within a vision. That is a possible reading.
My argument asks whether the Word’s introduction and the continued actions of the divine speaker support a personal manifestation.
That interpretation requires argument as well.
But neither possibility can be eliminated merely by identifying the revelation as a vision.
Then, in Genesis 15:7, the speaker declares:
אני יהוה אשר הוצאתיך מאור כשדים
“I am YHVH, who brought you out of Ur of the Chaldeans.”
The narrator has presented the Word of YHVH, sustained divine speech, action within the encounter, and the speaker’s identification as YHVH.
Those details are relevant to understanding the narrative.
Troy responds by inventing a representative man standing inside Abram’s tent.
Apparently, reconstructing an unmentioned figure is acceptable when Troy does it, but considering a personal manifestation within the narrative is unacceptable when I do it.
Quite the interpretive standard.
4. Troy’s Claim That Scholarship Would Reject This Interpretation
Perhaps the most revealing feature of Troy’s response is his repeated insistence that no academically credible scholar would entertain my interpretation.
Really?
Let us examine that claim against actual published biblical commentary.
The Pulpit Commentary, discussing Genesis 15:1, explicitly considers whether the Word of YHVH serves as a personal designation of the preincarnate Logos.
Significantly, the commentator does not claim that this conclusion is grammatically certain. Instead, the discussion acknowledges that the interpretation cannot be conclusively demonstrated while arguing that the surrounding narrative provides support for it.
That is precisely the kind of distinction Troy repeatedly refuses to make.
It is possible to consider a personal identification without claiming that Hebrew morphology alone proves it.
Adam Clarke, in his commentary on Genesis 15:1, also records an interpretation among earlier learned commentators connecting the Hebrew Word of YHVH with the Logos of John 1:1. Clarke additionally discusses the Aramaic Memra traditions in connection with that proposal.
These historical discussions do not establish that the personal-Word interpretation is correct, and they certainly do not demonstrate a scholarly consensus in its favor.
They do, however, establish that the interpretation was not invented by me and has appeared within published biblical exposition.
Troy’s categorical claim that no scholar would entertain such an interpretation is therefore historically indefensible.
One wonders whether Troy actually investigated the history of interpretation before announcing what scholarship supposedly permits.
Apparently, consulting the commentaries would have interrupted the rhetorical performance.
5. The Maqqef: Correct Grammar, Incorrect Conclusion
Troy devotes considerable attention to the maqqef and quotes William Henry Green’s A Grammar of the Hebrew Language, §43.
Green is correct about the grammatical function of the maqqef.
The maqqef joins words into an accentual unit. It does not erase the distinction between the individual lexical words, nor does it automatically transform a construct relationship into a compound divine name.
Gesenius–Kautzsch–Cowley, §16a, explains the same basic principle.
The construct expression דְּבַר־יְהוָה means “the Word of YHVH,” and the presence of the maqqef does not independently prove that the Word is YHVH.
That point deserves to be stated clearly.
Nevertheless, Troy commits another error when he acts as though demonstrating the limitations of the maqqef disproves every contextual argument for a personal Word.
It does not.
The examples he supplies, YHVH’s mountain, house, feast, servant, and priest, merely demonstrate that different nouns have different referents while occurring in construct relationships.
Exactly.
That is the point.
The Hebrew expression מַלְאַךְ יְהוָה (malakh YHVH), “the messenger of YHVH,” can refer to a personal messenger.
The expression בֵּית יְהוָה (beit YHVH), “the house of YHVH,” refers to a building or sacred dwelling place.
The grammatical relationship itself does not determine personhood.
Context does the necessary interpretive work.
When the messenger of YHVH appears in Exodus 3:2, followed by YHVH and Elohim speaking from the burning bush in verses 4–6, the theological questions arise from the identity and actions of the figure in the narrative.
They do not arise merely from the presence of a maqqef.
Interestingly, Troy even makes a mistake in his own list of Masoretic examples.
He claims that all five examples contain a construct chain joined by a maqqef. Yet in the Westminster Leningrad text of 1 Samuel 14:3, the relevant words appear as:
כֹּהֵן׀ יְהוָה
Notice the vertical paseq (׀) after כֹּהֵן (kohen, “priest”).
That is not a maqqef.
This does not invalidate Troy’s broader point about construct relationships, but it is a rather unfortunate oversight in an argument devoted to correcting someone else’s understanding of Hebrew notation.
Perhaps checking the Masoretic text before lecturing readers about its symbols would be advisable.
6. First Samuel 3:1–21: The Verses Troy Should Have Examined
Troy next accuses me of deliberately avoiding 1 Samuel 3:1 because it supposedly disproves my interpretation.
He quotes the verse describing the Word of YHVH as rare during Samuel’s early life.
Let us examine it.
ודבר־יהוה היה יקר בימים ההם אין חזון נפרץ
“The Word of YHVH was rare in those days; vision was not widespread.”
Troy asks how the Word could be rare if the Word were personal.
The answer is straightforward.
The adjective יָקָר (yaqar) describes the rarity of divine revelation within the historical setting. A personal agent, if such an agent were involved in revelation, could manifest or communicate infrequently.
The rarity of an appearance or activity does not determine whether the one appearing or acting is personal.
Nevertheless, the natural reading of verse 1 concerns the scarcity of prophetic revelation. I have no difficulty acknowledging that.
The question is what happens when the narrator moves from that introductory statement into Samuel’s actual encounter.
Troy concentrates on verses 1 and 7.
Curiously, he does not adequately engage verses 10 and 21.
And these are particularly important.
First Samuel 3:10: YHVH Came and Stood
The Hebrew states:
ויבא יהוה ויתיצב ויקרא כפעם־בפעם שמואל שמואל
“And YHVH came and stood and called as at the other times, ‘Samuel, Samuel.’”
Let us examine the verbal forms.
וַיָּבֹא (vayyavo) is a Qal wayyiqtol, third-person masculine singular, from בוא, “to come.”
וַיִּתְיַצַּב (vayyityatstsav) is a Hitpael wayyiqtol, third-person masculine singular, from יצב, “to station oneself” or “to stand.”
וַיִּקְרָא (vayyiqra) is a Qal wayyiqtol, third-person masculine singular, from קרא, “to call.”
And who is the explicitly named subject?
YHVH.
The narrator states that YHVH came, stood, and called Samuel.
This is considerably more substantial than simply declaring that a message was received.
Now, do these verbs independently establish that the Word is a second divine person? No.
But they certainly establish that the narrative describes YHVH’s personal initiative in a revelatory encounter.
Notice also that the passage does not simply state that Samuel received information. It describes an encounter in which YHVH comes, stands, and calls.
The description is sufficiently striking that Keil and Delitzsch, commenting on 1 Samuel 3:10, interpret it as an objectively real revelation rather than merely a dream of Samuel.
Again, this does not prove a distinct divine person. But it does demonstrate why reducing the entire narrative to a generic message is exegetically inadequate.
First Samuel 3:21: The Verse Troy Leaves Out
Now consider the chapter’s conclusion:
ויסף יהוה להראה בשלה כי נגלה יהוה אל־שמואל בשלו בדבר יהוה
“And YHVH continued to appear at Shiloh, for YHVH revealed himself to Samuel at Shiloh by the Word of YHVH.”
Notice the repeated language.
The verb לְהֵרָאֹה (lehera’oh) is a Niphal infinitive expressing appearance.
The verb נִגְלָה (niglah) is a Niphal perfect, third-person masculine singular, meaning “was revealed” or “revealed himself.”
And the verse explicitly associates YHVH’s self-revelation with:
בִּדְבַר יְהוָה (bidvar YHVH)
“By the Word of YHVH.”
The preposition בְּ can mark means or instrumentality. The verse therefore presents the Word as the means through which YHVH revealed himself.
Does that necessarily identify the Word as an independently personal mediator? No. The phrase can be interpreted in terms of prophetic communication.
But the narrative’s combination of divine appearance, divine self-revelation, and the Word of YHVH deserves examination.
The chapter begins by describing the rarity of revelation.
It then narrates YHVH coming, standing, and calling Samuel.
Finally, it concludes by describing YHVH’s continued appearances and revelation through the Word of YHVH.
That is the complete narrative progression, not merely the isolated statements Troy selects.
And if Troy wishes to accuse me of deliberately concealing inconvenient verses, perhaps he should first explain why his own discussion of 1 Samuel 3 gives so little attention to the chapter’s most explicit descriptions of divine appearance.
I would rather examine the verses than speculate about his motives.
He should extend the same courtesy.
7. First Samuel 4:1: Troy’s Imaginary “WordSamuel”
Troy considers 1 Samuel 4:1 especially devastating because it refers to the word of Samuel coming to Israel.
He sarcastically asks whether I would then have to believe in another personal being called the Word of Samuel.
No, Troy.
And the reason is rather elementary.
Identical grammatical constructions do not necessarily have identical referents.
In 1 Samuel 4:1, the immediate context concerns Samuel’s established prophetic ministry and his communication to Israel.
There is no narrative identifying a second personal figure associated with Samuel, no comparable divine manifestation, and no accompanying identification of the speaker with a divine name.
The expression naturally refers to Samuel’s prophetic word.
By contrast, passages concerning the Word of YHVH must be examined within their respective narratives of divine revelation.
Does 1 Samuel 4:1 establish that the noun דבר can denote a message?
Absolutely.
Does it establish that the expression devar YHVH can never participate in a narrative suggesting personal manifestation?
Not at all.
Troy’s argument incorrectly moves from a shared grammatical form to an assumed identity of semantic function in every context.
That is an unwarranted generalization.
One might as well argue that because the messenger of an ordinary king is a human representative, every biblical appearance of the messenger of YHVH must function identically in all narrative and theological respects.
The lexical and grammatical relationships may be similar. The contextual presentation of the referents must still be examined.
This is not special pleading.
It is contextual interpretation.
8. First Kings 19:9–13: Troy’s Explanation Creates More Questions Than It Answers
We now arrive at one of the most important passages in the discussion.
First Kings 19:9 states:
והנה אליו דבר־יהוה ויאמר לו מה־לך פה אליהו
“And behold, the Word of YHVH [was] to him, and he said to him, ‘What are you doing here, Elijah?’”
The noun דְּבַר־יְהוָה appears as the introduced source or content of the revelation, followed by the third-person masculine singular verbal form וַיֹּאמֶר (vayyomer).
Troy correctly observes that because דבר is grammatically masculine, the following verb does not independently establish personhood.
Agreed.
Biblical Hebrew grammatical gender is not equivalent to biological sex or ontological personhood.
But that observation does not settle the identity of the speaker.
Troy then provides several possible explanations, including the claim that the speaker may simply be an audible voice from YHVH.
That interpretation is possible, yet it requires eisegesis. Nothing in the context suggests Troy’s interpretation except for Troy.
The question, however, concerns the ensuing discourse.
Verse 11 states:
ויאמר צא ועמדת בהר לפני יהוה
“And he said, ‘Go out and stand on the mountain before YHVH.’”
The text then announces:
והנה יהוה עבר
“And behold, YHVH was passing by.”
Notice the relationship between the speech and the announced appearance of YHVH.
The speaker directs Elijah to stand before YHVH, and the narrative announces YHVH’s passing.
This is precisely why the passage deserves careful analysis.
Does the speaker refer to himself in the third person, or does the narrative present a distinction between the speaker and the one whose appearance is announced?
That question cannot be answered merely by asserting that the grammatical subject could be impersonal.
Troy appeals to illeism, the practice of referring to oneself in the third person.
I agree that Biblical Hebrew contains instances of divine self-reference in the third person.
For example, Exodus 34:6 presents YHVH proclaiming his own divine name. Self-reference involving the divine name is therefore a genuine interpretive possibility.
But establishing that illeism exists does not demonstrate that it must be the explanation in 1 Kings 19:11. Again, another eisegesis moment.
A grammatical possibility is not the same thing as a demonstrated contextual interpretation.
To establish illeism here, Troy must explain why the speaker is most naturally identified with the YHVH whose passing is being announced, rather than merely pointing out that such self-reference can occur elsewhere.
Equally, the personal-distinction interpretation must show that the narrative actually presents distinguishable speakers, rather than assuming that every third-person reference indicates another divine person.
That is the exegetical issue.
Troy also suggests that an unidentified messenger may be speaking to Elijah.
An unidentified messenger?
Where does the narrator introduce this messenger?
Where is the messenger identified?
Troy supplies no explicit textual identification because the passage provides none. Another eisegesis for Troy.
Apparently, an unseen messenger can be introduced into the narrative as a legitimate possibility, while an interpretation involving the Word explicitly introduced in verse 9 must be rejected as theological imagination.
The irony is rather obvious.
There is also verse 15, which explicitly states:
ויאמר יהוה אליו
“And YHVH said to him.”
This verse identifies YHVH as the speaker in the continuing encounter.
Any interpretation of the passage, including mine, must account for that explicit identification.
The personal-distinction proposal must explain how the Word’s narrative role relates to YHVH’s direct speech. The illeism proposal must explain the third-person references within the preceding encounter.
The proper scholarly response is to examine the complete discourse, not declare one interpretation impossible because another can be imagined.
9. Troy’s Hypothetical Dream: When Speculation Becomes Exegesis
Troy then offers what may be the most extraordinary suggestion in his entire article.
He proposes that Elijah may have fallen asleep in the cave and dreamed the whole encounter.
Why?
Because Elijah had traveled for forty days and nights, and the wind, earthquake, and fire supposedly seem more appropriate to a dream than to an actual event.
Seriously?
The narrative says Elijah lodged in a cave. It does not say that the encounter occurred while he was sleeping.
The account contains no explicit dream formula.
No narrator announces that Elijah dreamed.
No subsequent passage states that he awoke from the encounter.
Troy’s proposed dream is therefore speculative.
Interestingly, he acknowledges that it is speculative, yet proceeds to treat it as another preferable explanation.
His appeal to Numbers 12:6–7 does not resolve the problem.
That passage establishes that YHVH communicates with prophets through visions and dreams. It does not establish that every prophetic encounter must occur through one of those means when the narrative does not specify otherwise.
Moreover, Numbers 12:6–8 itself distinguishes different modes of divine communication, particularly in its discussion of Moses.
The text provides no universal rule requiring the interpreter to presume sleep whenever divine communication occurs.
Troy’s explanation therefore moves from a general biblical observation about prophetic revelation to a highly specific historical reconstruction that the narrative never supplies.
And his additional argument concerning the wind, earthquake, and fire is hardly persuasive.
Since when does the dramatic nature of a theophanic account prove that it must have been a dream?
Is the reader supposed to believe that because the events are extraordinary, they must be imaginary?
The entire Hebrew Bible contains extraordinary accounts of divine manifestations.
One cannot simply reclassify them as dreams because their descriptions appear too dramatic for one’s preferred reading.
Even if the event were visionary, it would still not settle whether the communicating figure was personal.
Once again, Troy confuses the mode of an encounter with the identity of the one encountered.
And after inventing a possible dream, an unidentified messenger, and a detailed reconstruction of how the scene may have unfolded, he continues accusing me of importing assumptions into the text.
That is certainly an interesting application of methodological consistency.
10. Is Contextual Differentiation Really Special Pleading?
Troy finally objects to my distinction between occurrences in which devar YHVH plainly denotes divine communication and passages in which the Word appears within more elaborate revelatory narratives.
He calls this special pleading.
But contextual differentiation is not special pleading.
Special pleading occurs when someone introduces an unjustified exception to protect a favored conclusion.
Recognizing that a noun may possess different semantic functions in different contexts is ordinary linguistic analysis.
For instance, דבר can denote a spoken message, an event, a matter, or a thing depending upon the literary and grammatical context.
Those different uses do not require abandoning its lexical identity.
Similarly, the expression “Word of YHVH” may refer to the content of revelation in one passage, while another passage raises additional questions about divine agency or manifestation.
However, one important qualification must be made.
The formula “the Word of YHVH came to” does not, by itself, identify a personal being.
Troy’s examples from Jeremiah demonstrate that this formula frequently introduces prophetic messages.
That is legitimate evidence.
Consequently, a personal interpretation cannot be defended by establishing an automatic rule that every occurrence of this introductory formula identifies a divine person.
Instead, the question must be whether the particular narrative supplies additional indicators warranting that interpretation.
Such indicators might include the presentation of the speaker, explicit descriptions of appearance or action, participant continuity, and relationships between the figures identified in the discourse.
Genesis 15, 1 Samuel 3, and 1 Kings 19 should therefore be examined individually before drawing a cumulative theological conclusion.
Troy’s examples establish that the impersonal-message reading is common and frequently appropriate.
They do not establish that the personal interpretation is impossible in every passage.
Likewise, the fact that some historical Christian commentators have proposed a personal-Word interpretation does not establish that the interpretation must be correct.
The evidence must carry the argument.
That is the difference between responsible exegesis and simply assigning every occurrence of a phrase the meaning preferred by one’s theological system.
Conclusion: Troy Has Demonstrated Possibility, Not Exclusion
After all the English translations, grammatical observations, telegraph illustrations, hypothetical messengers, and imagined dreams, what has Troy actually demonstrated?
He has shown that דְּבַר־יְהוָה frequently refers to divine communication.
Correct.
He has shown that the maqqef does not independently establish personal identity.
Correct.
He has shown that the Hebrew construct state does not automatically identify the Word as a divine person.
Again, correct.
But none of these observations establishes that a personal understanding of the Word of YHVH is excluded by the narratives under investigation.
And Troy’s repeated declarations that my interpretation is impossible are considerably stronger than the evidence he has presented.
Particularly revealing is his treatment of 1 Samuel 3.
He criticizes my supposed omission of verse 1 while failing to deal adequately with verse 10, where YHVH comes and stands, or verse 21, where YHVH’s continued appearance is explicitly associated with the Word of YHVH.
Likewise, his discussion of Genesis 15 introduces a male figure inside Abram’s tent without textual identification, while his explanation of 1 Kings 19 invokes an unidentified messenger or an entirely speculative dream.
Apparently, interpretive reconstruction is objectionable only when it supports a Trinitarian conclusion.
The larger theological question remains whether biblical narratives describing the Word, the Messenger of YHVH, and divine self-manifestation provide evidence of personal distinction within the identity of YHVH, and whether the New Testament’s presentation of Jesus as the Word illuminates those earlier texts.
That question is not settled by a Hebrew hyphen, an English translation, or a single lexical definition.
It requires sustained examination of the biblical evidence.
Troy has established that my interpretation is not grammatically compulsory. He has not established that it is grammatically impossible or contextually indefensible.
Those are very different conclusions.
And this distinction matters because refuting an argument that claims necessity is not the same as refuting an argument that proposes a plausible interpretation supported by cumulative evidence.
So, Troy, I appreciate the discussion of the maqqef. I appreciate the examples demonstrating that דבר can denote a message. I even appreciate the appeal to established Hebrew grammar.
But I would appreciate it considerably more if you stopped presenting legitimate grammatical limitations as though they were comprehensive theological refutations.
The Biblical Hebrew deserves better than that.
And so do your readers.
You have demonstrated that the Word of YHVH can mean a message from YHVH. What you have not demonstrated is that the biblical narratives cannot present the Word as a personal manifestation of YHVH.
Until you establish that exclusion from the text itself, your rebuttal remains incomplete.
And no, Troy, imagining Elijah asleep in a cave does not make up the difference.
Scholarly works referenced: Wilhelm Gesenius, Hebrew Grammar, edited by E. Kautzsch and translated by A. E. Cowley, §16a; William Henry Green, A Grammar of the Hebrew Language, §43; The Pulpit Commentary, Genesis 15:1 and 1 Samuel 3:21; Adam Clarke, Commentary on the Bible, Genesis 15:1; C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament, Genesis 15 and 1 Samuel 3.
Final Response to Troy Salinger: Declaring Victory Is Not the Same as Demonstrating It
Troy Salinger concludes his article with the triumphant announcement that my interpretation of the Word of YHVH has been exposed as grammatically incorrect, academically unsupported, and contrary to sound reasoning and common sense.
Quite the victory speech!
Unfortunately, there is one rather significant problem: Troy has not demonstrated what his conclusion claims he has demonstrated.
What he has actually established is that the Hebrew noun דָּבָר (davar) can refer to a spoken message, that the construct relationship דְּבַר־יְהוָה (devar YHVH) does not automatically establish personhood, and that the maqqef affects accentuation rather than transforming two lexical words into a single divine name.
All three observations are grammatically correct.
And none of them resolves the central question of whether certain biblical narratives present the Word of YHVH as personally distinguishable from YHVH.
Troy apparently believes that explaining what a Hebrew grammatical construction does not establish is equivalent to disproving every possible interpretation of the narrative in which that construction occurs.
That is not a refutation. That is a rather elementary confusion between morphology, semantics, syntax, and contextual exegesis.
1. Let Us Settle the Hebrew Grammar Once and for All
The Hebrew expression דְּבַר־יְהוָה consists of a noun in the construct state followed by the divine proper name YHVH.
Its grammatical translation is “the Word of YHVH.”
The maqqef joins the two elements into an accentual unit without abolishing their distinct lexical identities or their construct relationship.
Gesenius–Kautzsch–Cowley, Hebrew Grammar, §16a, explains the function of the maqqef precisely in terms of tone and pointing.
This is not controversial.
When I emphasize the expression as “Word-YHVH,” I am drawing attention to the closely connected Hebrew designation, not claiming that the grammatical genitive relationship has disappeared. If my spoken presentation suggested that the maqqef alone establishes a distinct divine person, that would be an overstatement. The argument for personal distinction must come from the narrative evidence.
But this clarification does not establish Troy’s theological conclusion either.
The expression may refer to divine communication, and in many passages that is plainly its function. The question is whether particular narratives employ the expression in a manner that supports something more.
The fact that a word commonly refers to an impersonal message does not establish that it can never function in connection with a personal manifestation.
That question must be decided exegetically.
Troy has repeatedly treated the conventional meaning of the expression as though it constitutes an absolute prohibition against any other contextual understanding.
Yet no Hebrew grammar he has cited establishes such a prohibition.
2. Troy’s Absolute Claim About Scholarship Is Historically False
Troy’s conclusion contains the remarkable assertion that I have neither Hebrew grammar nor scholarship supporting my interpretation.
Let us address the scholarly claim directly.
The Pulpit Commentary, in its discussion of Genesis 15:1, explicitly considers whether the Word of YHVH functions as a personal designation of the preincarnate Logos.
The commentator acknowledges that the identification is not susceptible to complete demonstration but argues that the language throughout the narrative lends support to it.
In other words, a published biblical commentator has considered precisely the type of interpretation Troy claims no competent scholar would entertain.
Adam Clarke, commenting on Genesis 15:1, similarly records the position of earlier learned interpreters who associated the Hebrew Word of YHVH with the Logos of John 1:1. Clarke also discusses the Aramaic Memra tradition in this connection.
Now, do these commentators establish my interpretation beyond dispute?
Of course not.
Nor am I claiming that they represent the consensus of contemporary Hebrew scholarship, including the book by two scholars, ISRAEL’S LORD: YHWH AS “TWO POWERS IN SECOND TEMPLE LITERATURE.
But they establish something Troy’s argument emphatically denies: the personal interpretation of the Word of YHVH has a documented history within biblical commentary.
Troy may disagree with those interpreters. He may reject their theological conclusions. He may even consider their arguments unpersuasive.
But he can no longer responsibly maintain that the interpretation is entirely absent from scholarship.
Perhaps consulting the history of biblical interpretation before declaring an interpretation academically unthinkable would have been worthwhile.
3. The Biblical Narratives Still Require Explanation
Throughout his article, Troy repeatedly appeals to passages in which the Word of YHVH clearly denotes divine communication.
I agree that such passages exist.
But the passages I have emphasized raise additional questions.
In Genesis 15:1, the Word of YHVH comes to Abram in a vision. The narrative continues with divine speech, Abram’s response to Adonai YHVH, the action of bringing Abram outside in verse 5, and the speaker’s declaration in verse 7:
אני יהוה
“I am YHVH.”
Those details do not automatically prove the existence of two divine persons. They do, however, require attention to the identity and continuity of the speaker within the visionary encounter.
In 1 Samuel 3:10, the narrator explicitly states:
ויבא יהוה ויתיצב
“And YHVH came and stood.”
The chapter then concludes in 1 Samuel 3:21 by stating that YHVH continued to appear to Samuel and revealed himself בִּדְבַר יְהוָה (bidvar YHVH), “by the Word of YHVH.”
Here the narrative joins the language of divine appearance and self-revelation to the Word of YHVH.
A strictly communicative interpretation is possible, but merely translating the noun דבר as “message” does not eliminate the need to explain the narrative’s language of appearance.
Likewise, in 1 Kings 19:9–11, the Word of YHVH is introduced, the speaker commands Elijah to stand before YHVH, and the narrative then announces that YHVH is passing by.
Does the speaker refer to himself in the third person, or does the discourse present distinguishable participants?
That remains an exegetical question.
I recognize that divine illeism is a genuine feature of biblical discourse. But one must establish its function in the particular passage rather than assume that its existence elsewhere automatically explains the present narrative.
The possibility of an alternative interpretation does not, by itself, demonstrate that the personal-distinction interpretation is grammatically impossible.
And this is precisely where Troy has failed to establish the comprehensive refutation he claims.
4. Troy’s Four Footnotes Do Not Rescue His Argument
Troy ends his article with four footnotes, apparently intended to reinforce the scholarly foundation of his conclusions.
Let us briefly examine them.
His first footnote correctly explains the maqqef as an accentual connector. Fine. That point is established Hebrew grammar, but it does not determine the personal or impersonal identity of the Word in a particular narrative.
His second footnote directs readers to another article he wrote about visions and dreams.
How reassuring.
Troy supports his interpretation of biblical visions by citing his own interpretation of biblical visions.
There is nothing inherently wrong with referencing one’s previous work. However, citing oneself does not supply independent confirmation of the premises under dispute.
More importantly, Troy continues to confuse the mode of revelation with the identity of the one revealed.
Even if a vision involves images perceived within the visionary’s consciousness, that does not establish that the divine being represented is merely an impersonal construct.
Daniel’s vision of the Ancient of Days in Daniel 7 provides an obvious example. The visionary mode of presentation does not eliminate the personal identity of the figure presented within the vision.
Troy’s third footnote explains grammatical gender in Biblical Hebrew and appeals to Balaam’s donkey in Numbers 22:28.
This is particularly interesting.
Troy argues that an English translation may use “it” for a grammatically feminine Hebrew noun because the referent is not a human person.
That observation concerning English pronoun selection is fair enough.
But grammatical gender and ontological identity are separate questions.
The donkey in Numbers 22:28 is an animate individual that actually speaks within the narrative. Some English translations call the donkey “she,” while others use “it.” Neither pronoun determines whether the donkey is a real participant in the narrated event.
An English pronoun does not establish the ontology of the Hebrew referent.
Likewise, rendering וַיֹּאמֶר (vayyomer) as “he said” or “it said” does not independently settle whether the Word of YHVH is personal in 1 Kings 19. Hebrew grammatical gender does not, by itself, answer that question.
Apparently, the donkey illustration demonstrates less than Troy imagines.
Finally, his fourth footnote appeals to illeism, the practice of referring to oneself in the third person.
Again, this is a legitimate linguistic phenomenon.
But identifying a rhetorical possibility is not the same as establishing that it is occurring in a particular passage.
If Troy believes YHVH is referring to himself in the third person in 1 Kings 19:11, he must defend that interpretation through the discourse and literary context.
Simply defining illeism does not establish its application.
Four footnotes, several valid grammatical observations, and still no demonstration that the Word of YHVH cannot function personally within the narratives under discussion.
5. The Real Issue Is Personal Distinction, Not Whether God Communicates Messages
Let me clarify something that Troy’s article repeatedly overlooks.
My argument is not that YHVH never communicates verbal messages.
Nor is my argument that every occurrence of דְּבַר־יְהוָה identifies a distinct divine person.
Nor does Biblical Hebrew require the reader to accept the doctrine of the Trinity merely because a noun appears in a construct relationship.
Those are not adequate formulations of the argument I am defending.
The broader question is whether the Hebrew Scriptures contain narratives in which the Word of YHVH functions in a manner that supports personal distinction within the divine identity.
This requires examining grammatical constructions, verbal predicates, narrative participants, divine appearances, and the relationship between the speaker and YHVH.
For Christian theology, the additional question concerns whether the New Testament’s identification of Jesus as the Word provides a legitimate canonical framework for understanding those earlier passages.
That conclusion must be argued, not assumed.
But Troy has not disproved it merely by establishing that דבר frequently refers to verbal communication.
In fact, his repeated insistence that there can be no personal understanding of the Word risks committing the very methodological error he accuses me of making: allowing a preferred theological conclusion to determine what interpretive possibilities are permitted before all the relevant evidence has been examined.
6. Troy’s Final Problem: His Conclusion Exceeds His Evidence
Throughout his article, Troy repeatedly characterizes my conclusions as bizarre, eccentric, grammatically unsupported, and contrary to common sense.
Yet his own explanations include a representative man appearing inside Abram’s tent, an unidentified messenger potentially speaking to Elijah, and the suggestion that the entire encounter in 1 Kings 19 may have been a dream.
The first reconstruction contains details not explicitly supplied by Genesis 15. The proposed unidentified messenger is not introduced by the narrator of 1 Kings 19. And the dream hypothesis lacks an explicit textual indication that Elijah was dreaming during the encounter.
These are interpretive proposals, not established facts.
I do not object to considering interpretive possibilities. Biblical exegesis regularly involves weighing competing explanations.
What I object to is the inconsistency of condemning my interpretation as speculative while presenting his own speculative reconstructions as obviously superior.
Troy’s theological assumptions deserve precisely the same scrutiny that he demands of mine.
And there is a further issue.
My thesis requires positive textual evidence. I have an obligation to demonstrate why a personal-distinction interpretation adequately accounts for the narratives rather than merely insisting that it remains possible.
I accept that responsibility.
But Troy has assumed an equally demanding responsibility by declaring that the interpretation has no grammatical, contextual, scholarly, or rational support whatsoever.
His evidence does not justify such an absolute conclusion.
He has challenged one possible grammatical overstatement concerning the maqqef. He has demonstrated the ordinary communicative function of דבר. He has offered alternative readings of several passages.
What he has not done is demonstrate that those alternatives are the only exegetically defensible readings or that the historical personal-Word interpretation is inherently impossible.
That is the difference between offering a counterargument and establishing a conclusive refutation.
Final Conclusion: Read the Hebrew, Not Troy’s Imagination
At the beginning of his article, Troy announced that my interpretations were driven by theological presuppositions.
At the end, he congratulates himself for exposing those alleged presuppositions.
What happened between those two announcements?
He correctly explained the maqqef, collected English translations showing that the Word of YHVH frequently refers to divine communication, introduced several speculative reconstructions of biblical encounters, and repeatedly asserted that my interpretation cannot be supported by Hebrew grammar.
What he did not do was demonstrate that the relevant narratives categorically exclude personal distinction.
And this is why his victory announcement is premature.
The Hebrew construct state establishes the grammatical relationship between דבר and YHVH. It does not, by itself, establish or exclude the personal identity of the Word. That question belongs to narrative exegesis and, ultimately, broader biblical theology.
The Hebrew remains what it is, regardless of whether the interpreter is Trinitarian, Unitarian, or anything else.
Genesis 15 still introduces the Word of YHVH within a divine visionary encounter.
First Samuel 3 still describes YHVH coming, standing, and revealing himself through the Word of YHVH.
First Kings 19 still presents a divine speaker instructing Elijah to stand before YHVH, whose passing is then announced.
These texts require careful interpretation. They cannot be resolved by grammatical slogans, personal accusations, or appeals to supposed scholarly ridicule.
Troy is welcome to disagree with my conclusions. He is welcome to challenge my reading of the Hebrew. He is even welcome to demonstrate where my grammatical explanations require greater precision.
That is how biblical scholarship works.
But criticism becomes a genuine refutation only when the evidence actually establishes what the critic claims.
Troy has demonstrated that the Word of YHVH can refer to a divine message. Congratulations, Troy. Nobody familiar with the lexical range of דבר should find that surprising.
The question I raised was whether particular biblical narratives also support understanding the Word as a personal manifestation of YHVH, ultimately to be evaluated in light of the New Testament’s presentation of the Logos.
That question requires substantially more than reminding readers that Hebrew nouns can refer to spoken messages.
So, Troy, you may consider my interpretation bizarre. You may dislike my conclusions. You may even devote another article to speculating about my theological motivations.
But none of those things changes the Hebrew text.
And declaring that you have defeated an interpretation is not the same as demonstrating that you have.
Perhaps next time, less time could be spent examining my supposed intellectual shortcomings and more time examining the actual grammatical and narrative evidence.
Because at the end of the day, Troy, the question was never whether YHVH speaks.
The question is whether the Word of YHVH is presented in certain passages as more than the content of what YHVH speaks.
That was the question when I began my video.
And despite Troy’s lengthy article and rather enthusiastic declaration of victory, it remains the question his rebuttal has not conclusively answered. Nice try, Troy, but no cigar.
